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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick*

Supreme Court Adopts
Replacement Cost Method of
Valuing Collateral for Chapter 13
Cram Down Purposes

Since the Bankruptcy Code was
enacted as part of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, courts have not
agreed on the proper standard for
valuing collateral for the purpose of
determining the rights of an objecting secured creditor when the debtor
proposes to keep collateral under a
Chapter 13 plan. Although the conflict over the most appropriate standard for determining collateral value
had beeq fought primarily on the
b!.inkruptcy co1,1rt level, this, battle
has moved up to the appellate courts
in recent years.
Conflicting appellate decisionseach focusing on a bankruptcy
court's valuation of a secured
creditor's interest in a motor vehicle
retained by the debtor under a Chapter 13 plan-had resulted in a lack
of uniformity with respect to valua• Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.; Counsel
to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver
& Jacobson, New York, N.Y.; Reporter' to
the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States; memjleroftheNational Bankruptcy Conference. The views expressed in
this article are the author's own.

tion methods. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court's
valuation of a truck based on its net
foreclosure sale value, ratherthan its
retail or replacement value.' The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was proper to base
the value of collateral on its replacement value or retail price,2 while the
Seventh Circuit adoptpd_a split-thedifference approach based on the
average between the wholesale value
and the retail value. 3
The Rash Case

This division among the circuits
led to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash.4 In 1989, Mr. Rash,
who needed a tractor truck for his
freight-hauling business, purchased
such a vehicle for $73,700. He made
a down payment and gave the seller
a security interest in the truck to secure his-agreement to pay the balance in sixty monthly installments.
The seller assigned the note and the
1 In re Rash, 90 F3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en bane).
,
2 In re Trimble, 50 F3d 530 (8th Cir.
1995).
3 In re Hoskins, 102 F3d 311 (7th Cir.
1996).
4
117 S.<:t. 1879 (1997).
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security interest to Associates CoQ1mercial Corporation (ACC).
Three years after the purchase of
the truck-when the balance due
was $41, 171-Rash and his wife
filed a joint Chapter 13 petition in
the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas, listed ACC as
a S'ecured creditor, and filed a plan
that prpvided that Rash would retain
the truck for use in his freight-:hauling business. The plan proposed to
pay ACC, over fifty-eight months,
an amount equal to the value of the
truck. The debtors alleged in the
Chapter 13 petition that the va:lue of
the truck was $28,500. ACC objected to the plan, asked the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay
to permit it to repossess the truck,
and filed a proof of claim alleging
that its claim was fully secured in
the amount of $41,171. l'he Rashes
filed an objection to the proof of
claim.
Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy
Code sets forth the requirements for
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. 5
With respect to a secured claim, Section 1325(a)(5) permits a court to
confirm the plan if one of three alternative conditions are satisfied.
Two of these alternative conditions-i.e., the secured creditor accepts the plan, 6 or the debtor
surrenders the collateral to the secured creditor7-were not satisfied
in the Rash case. The third alternative, often referred to as the "cram
s 11

usc§ 1325.
See 11 USC § 1325(a)(5)(A).
7 See 11 USC§ I325(a)(5)(C).

6
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down" alternative, permits the debtor
to retain the collateral over the secured creditor's objection, but only
if the plan provides that the creditor
retain its lien and that the debtor will
pay the creditor, during the life of
the plan, an amount that has a present
value of "llOt less than the "allowed
amount" of the secured claim. 8 If the
creditor has an unsecured deficiency
cl~m because the value of the collateral is less than the unpaid balance
of the debt, the plan also must satisfy the requirements for .treating an
unsecured claim under Section
1325.9

Bankruptcy Court Values Truck
Based on Probable Net
Foreclosure Sale Proceeds
Since Rash proposed to keep the
truck over ACC's objection, the
bankruptcy court had to determine
the "allowed amount" of the secured
claim. Section 506(a) of the Code
provides, in part:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor
secured by a lien on property in ,which
the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property ...
and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest ... is less than the amount of
such allowed claim. Such value shall
be determined in light of the purpos~
of the valuation and of the proposed
disposition or use of such property,
and in conjunction with any hearing
See II USC§ 1325(a)(5)(B).
See 11 USC §§ 506(a), 1325(a)(4),
I325(b).
8

9
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on such disposition or use or on a plan
affecting such creditor's interest. 10

The bankruptcy court in Rash held
an evidentiary hearing to resolve the
dispute over the truck's value. ACC
urged the court to use as a valuation
standard the so-called replacement
value test, which focuses on the price
that the debtor would have to pay to
purchase a like vehicle, estimated by
ACC's expert to be $41,000. The
debtors challenged that approach
and urged the court to base the value
on the net amount that ACC would
realize upon a foreclosure and sale.
of the truck, estimated by its expert
to be $31,875. The bankruptcy court
found that $31,875 was the amount
that ACC would realize if it exercised its repossession and sale rights,
set the allowed amount of the secured claim at that figure, and confirmed the plan. The result of the
court's ruling was that ACC would
receive, with respect to its secured
claim, cash payments under the plan
that would have a present value of
$31,875. The district court affirmed.
ACC's appeal to the Fifth Circuit
enjoyed initial success when a
panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the bankruptcy court's valuation determination. 11 But the Fifth
Circuit granted the debtor's tequest
for a hearing en bane and then affirmed the decisi<;m of the district
court, holding that ACC's allowed
secured claim was limited to
10
11

11 USC§ 506(a).
lnreRash,31 F3d325 (5thCir. 1994).

$31,875 based on the net amount
likely to be realized in a foreclosure. 12
Fifth Circuit Focuses on State Law
Remedies
The Fifth Circuit, in its en bane
decision, recognized a ·conflict between using the. replacement cost
method of valuation to determine the
allowed amount of the secured
claim, as urged by ACC, and state
law that defined the rights and remedies of a secured creditor. Under the
law of Texas-which adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code-a secured creditor has the
right to foreclose and sell the collateral.13 The Fifth Circuit commented
that valuing collateral under a replacement cost standard would result in a value that is generall~ higher
than the amount that a secured creditor would realize by exercising its
foreclosure remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code. This result,
which would "change the extent to
which ACC is secured from what
obtained under state law prior to the
bankruptcy filing," 14 should be resisted by "federal courts unless
"clearly compelled" by the Bankruptcy Code. 15 The Fifth Circuit then
concluded that the Bankruptcy
Code, in particular Section 506(a),
does nof compel a replacement cost
standard for collateral valuation.
12

In re Rash, 90 F3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996)

(en bane).
13
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§
9.504(a) and (c), 9.505 (1991).
14
90 F3d at 1041.
1
' 90 F3d at 1042.
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Focusing on the first sentence of
Section 506(a), the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the collateral must be
valued from the creditor's perspective based on the rights it has under state law-which are limited to
repossession and sale. For that reason, the Court of Appeals upheld
the foreclosure value standard of
valuation used by the bankruptcy
court.
Supreme Court Adopts
Replacement Value Standard

Because of the conflict among the
circuits regarding the proper method
of valuing collateral-i.e., whether
to use the replacement value approach, the foreclosure value approach, or the split the difference
approach-the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Rash. After analyzing Section 506(a), the Supreme
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and
held that, in a cram down case, "the
value of the property (and thus the
amount of the secured claim under
§ 506(a)) is the price a willing buyer
in the debtor's trade, business, or
situation would pay to obtain like
property from a willing seller." 16
But, the Court explained, "we do not
suggest that a creditor is entitled to
recover what it would cost the debtor
to purchase th~ collateral brand
new." 17 Rather, the bankruptcy court
must determine the price that such a
buyer would pay for "property of
like age and condition." 18 By adopt16

117 S. Ct. at 1884.
117 S. Ct. at 1884, n. 2.
Is Id.

17
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ing this replacement value approach,
the Supreme Court rejected the
"typically lower foreclosure-value
standard" approved by the Fifth
Circuit. 19
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
Court, criticized the Fifth Circuit for
relying on the first sentence of Section 506(a) to conclude that the foreclosure standard of valuation is
required. The first sentence uses a
certain phrase-"the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property"-which led the Fifth Circuit to hold that collateral value must
be based on the limited foreclosure
rights of the secured creditor under
state law. But the Supreme Court
concluded that this phrase "imparts
no valuation standard."20 Rather, the
phrase "recognizes that a court may
encounter, and in such instances
must evaluate, limited or partial interests in collatera1."21 Examining
the first sentence of Section 506(a)
in its entirety, the Court also noted
that the sentence "tells a court what
it must evaluate, but it does not say
more; it is not enlightening on how
to value the collatera1."22
The Supreme Court then found
that the second, not the first, sentence of Section 506(a) "does speak
to the how question." 23 The second
19
117 S. Ct. at 1884. Compare the dissenting opinion in which Justice Stevens
wrote that, although Section 506(a) .is not
entirely clear, "I think its text points to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in
this case." 117 S. Ct. at 1887.
20
117 S. Ct. at 1884.
21
117 S. Ct. at 1885.
22 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
23 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
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sentence provides.that value "shall
be determined in light of ... the proposed disposition or use of such
property." 24 The Court wrote that,
because of that sentence, the proposed disposition or use of the collateral "is of paramount importance
to the valuation question."25 After
considering the options that a debtor
has regarding the collateral, the
Court commented that
Applying a foreclosure-value standard when the cram down optio~ is
invoked attributes no significance to
the different c6nsequences of the
debtor's choice to surrender the propetl:y or retain it. A replacement-value
standard, on the other hand, distinguishes retention from surrender and
renders meaningful the key words
'disposition or use:' 26
The Court recognized that, from
both the debtor'_s and the creditor's
perspectives, surrender and'retention
are not equivalent.
'o/hen a debtor surrenders the property, a creditor obtains it immediately,
and ·is free to sell it and reinvest the
proceeds. We recall here that ACC
sought that very advantage. . . . If a
debtor keeps the property and continues to use it, the· creditor obtains at
once neither the property nor its value
and·is exposed to double risks:·The
debtor ma)C again default and t~e
property may deteriorate from extended use. Adjustments in the interest rate and secured creditor demands
for more''adequate protection' ... do
not fully offset these-risks."27

The Supreme Court did not sympathize with the Fifth Circuit's relucta!lce to disrespect applicable
state law that defined the secured
creditor's remedies as being limited.
to repossession I}Ild realization of net
foreclosure value. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the Bankruptcy Code, including Chapter 13,
"has reshaped debtor and creditor
rights in marked departure from state
law." 28 By allowing a Chapter 13
debtor,to retain collateral over the
objection of a secured creditor, the
Code displaces state law ·rights to
foreclosure upon a debtor's default.
"It no more disrupts state law to
ma),ce 'disposition or use' the guide
for valuation than to authorize the
rearrangement of rights the cram
down ppwer entails. " 29
The Court also rejected the
"ruleless approach allowing use of
different valuation standards based
on the facts and circumstances of
individual cases" that was approved
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Valenti, 30 as well
as the "split-the-difference" approach sanctioned by the Seventh
Circuit in In re HoskinsY "Whatever
the attractiveness of a standard that
picks the midpoint between foreclosure and replacement values, there
is no warrant for it in the Code."32

'117 S. Ct. at 188'6.
117 S. Ct. at 1886.
30 105 F3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997).
31 102 F3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996).
2
3 117 S. Ct. at 1886.
28
29

24

11 USC § 506(a).
25
117 S. Ct. at 1885.
26
117 S. Ct. at 1885.
27
117 S. Ct. at 1885.
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A creditor should pot receive portions
of the retail price, if any,. that reflect
the value of items the debtor does not
receive when he.retains his vehicle,
items such as warranties, inventory
storage.lo and reconditioning .... Nor
should the creditor gain from modifications to the property-e.g., the addition of accessories to a vehicle-to
whi&h--a creditor's lien would not ex~
tend under state law."

The Sup~me Court's Not-So·
Simple Rule
But the Supreme Court did·agree
with the Seventh Circuit to the extent that it wrote in Hoskins that "a
simple rule of valuation is needed"
for purposes of predictability and
uniformity. 33
Ironically, the Supreme Court's
desire to have a simple rule was frustrated immediately after it set forth
the following apparently clear statement of its holding in Rash: "In sum,
under § 506(a), the value of property retained because the debtor has
exercised the§ 1325(a)(5)(B) 'cramdown' option is the cost the debtor
would incur to obtain a like asset for
the same 'proposed ... use. • " 34 At
the end of this sentence, the Court
added the following footnote 6whicb will likely become the most
often quoted, as well as criticized
language' of the entire opinion:
'
Our recognition that the replacementvalue standard, not the foreclosurevalue standard, governs in cram down
cases leaves to bankruptcy courts, as
triers of fact, identification of the best
way of ascertaining replacement
value on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether replacement value is
the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some other v;Uue will
depend on the type of debtor and the
nature of the property. We note, however, that replacement value, in this
context, should not include certain
items. For example, where the proper
measure of the replacement value of
a vehicle is its retail value, an adjustment to that value may be necessary:
33
34

[VOL 30 : 333 1998]

By recognizing that "replacement
value" might be the equivalent of the
retail value, wholesale value, or
some other value, depending on the
type of deptor and nature of the collateral, the Supreme Court seems to
have clouded the valuation issue as
much as it has clarified it, thereby
depriving bankruptcy courts of
needed guidance about how to determine value. Does the bankruptcy
court have to take into consideration
whether the debtor is a sophisticated
business executive who knows how
to obtain similar property at a ·wholesale price, rather than an unsophisticated consumer who would
normally pay the retail price from a
dealer? Does that mean that a particular debtor may have to pay the
retail price to retain collateral under
a plan, while another debtor can pay
a lower wholesale price to retain the
equivalent collateral? If retail price
is appropriate, how does a bankruptcy court dedu~t the value of
warranties-including an implied
warranty of merchantability urider
the Uniform Commercial Code?36
How does a court deduct
, an appro"117 S. Ct. at 1886, n. 6.
36 See UCC § 2-314.

102F3dat314.
1J 7 F3d at 1886.
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priate amount for "inventory storage" or other "items t!Je debtor
does not receive when he retains
his vehicle"?37
It remains to be seen how bankruptcy courts will apply the Rash
holding and the replacement value
standard in view of footnot~· 6. We
also will have to wait to see whether
bankruptcy courts will apply Rash
in other contexts that require valuation of collateral where the debtor
retains the collateral over a secured

creditor's objection. In any event, the
effect of the Rash holding will not
likely be limited to Chapter 13 cases.
Since the Court based its decision on
the language of Section 506(a)which applies in all types of bankruptcy cases 38-and the proposed
use of the property, its reasoning also
appears to be applicable to Chapter
11 and Chapter 12 cram downs
where the debtor will retain collateral under a plan. 39
38

See 11 USC§§ 103(a), 901(a).
See 11 USC §§ 1129(b)(2)(A),
1225(a)(5).
39

37

117 S. Ct. at 1886, n. 6.
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